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 1 Introduction
Financial markets play an important role in the e¢ cient allocation of resources. One im-
portant function of ￿nancial markets is to provide the price signals that guide investment
decisions. If the market price of a ￿rm is distorted, the ￿rm￿ s investment decisions will also
be distorted. In this paper we present a general equilibrium model in which debt-￿nanced
￿rms face the risk of bankruptcy in some states of nature.1 The price at which the ￿rm￿ s
assets can be liquidated in those states is one of the determinants of the present market
value of the ￿rm. If those prices are liquidity constrained, the current market value of the
￿rm is reduced and that in turn will a⁄ect current investment decisions.
The e¢ cient markets hypothesis requires, inter alia, that markets for ￿nancial assets are
liquid, both in the sense that prices are insensitive to the volume of trades and in the sense
that traders are not liquidity constrained. We investigate an environment where traders
may be liquidity constrained and hence asset prices may also re￿ ect the amount of liquid
assets in the buyers￿possession, and not only the assets￿future returns. Liquidity matters
particularly in the event of default, where creditors are paid o⁄ with the proceeds from the
liquidation of the borrower￿ s assets. In the absence of a liquid market, these assets may be
sold at ￿resale prices, causing a signi￿cant loss to the creditors. The anticipation of such a
loss will in turn increase the cost of borrowing and reduce the ￿rm￿ s initial investment. We
consider the case where, besides this possible loss, there are no other costs of default and
there are no other events where liquidity considerations matter.
The impact of anticipated defaults and illiquid asset markets is intimately tied up with
the incompleteness of markets. We consider an environment where there are no commitment
issues; hence, if markets are complete, there is no need for default in the ￿rst place. Borrowers
and lenders can achieve whatever state-contingent incomes they want by trading contingent
claims. As a consequence, when markets are complete, there is never a shortage of liquidity
and assets are always e¢ ciently priced. By contrast, if the available debt instruments do not
allow for state contingent payments, it is possible that in some states borrowers will have
insu¢ cient resources to pay their debts. Further, there may be no way to hedge against
capital losses resulting from default, in which case investment decisions may be distorted.
Thus, incomplete markets, default and liquidity are jointly responsible for the distortion of
prices and investment decisions.
To illustrate these ideas, we use a three-period model in which ￿rms owned by risk neutral
entrepreneurs may undertake projects requiring an investment in the ￿rst period and pro-
ducing output in the later periods. Entrepreneurs have no resources and must ￿nance their
investment by issuing debt, which is purchased by a large set of identical consumers. The
only uncertainty concerns the timing of output: the project undertaken by any entrepreneur
will produce output in either the second or third period, but not both. This uncertainty
about the timing of production together with the unavailability of contingent debt instru-
ments are what generate the risk of default. An entrepreneur who is unable to repay or to
1We assume that all investment is debt ￿nanced for simplicity. Similar arguments could be made with
both debt and equity, but the analysis would be much more complicated.
2renegotiate his debt is forced to default, liquidate his ￿rm￿ s assets and give the proceeds to
the creditors.
The crucial friction in our model arises from a ￿cash in advance￿constraint. This con-
straint is binding only in the event of default. The bankruptcy code is assumed to require the
resolution of the defaulted debt by means of an immediate payment to creditors in cash, not
of an IOU for future payment. Hence, the assets of a defaulting ￿rm (its claims to present
or future production) must be sold for cash and creditors are not allowed to use anticipated
receipts from the bankruptcy proceedings as collateral to buy such assets in the market. As
a consequence, ￿rms￿asset prices are sometimes determined by the amount of cash in the
market rather than by future earnings.
It is important to note that a ￿rm￿ s revenue stream is una⁄ected by default: if the ￿rm
is sold for less than its fundamental value, the sellers￿loss is the buyers￿gain. Moreover,
all consumers are identical, so that default does not even have an e⁄ect on the distribution
of wealth.2 Hence, bankruptcy is always e¢ cient ex post and, since the representative
consumer takes both sides of every trade being at the same time creditor and buyer of the
￿rms that are liquidated, his consumption is una⁄ected by a ￿rm￿ s liquidation. Nonetheless,
a pro￿t-maximizing entrepreneur, anticipating the ￿rm￿ s loss of market value when the ￿rm
is liquidated, will make ine¢ cient investment decisions.
The heart of the paper is the characterization of the conditions under which competitive
equilibria are e¢ cient, that is, liquidity constraints do not bind, and of the consequences
when they do bind. If the entrepreneurs who produce early default in equilibrium, there
is no future output to sell and default does not generate any demand for liquidity in the
asset market. We call this the case of no asset sales. Alternatively, if the entrepreneurs who
default are late producers, their claims to future output have to be liquidated in order to pay
￿cash￿to the creditors. If the liquidity available in the market is su¢ ciently high, the buyers
will pay the fundamental value for the liquidated ￿rms. This is the case of a liquid market.
But if the amount of liquidity is too low, there is an illiquid market and the market-clearing
price will be liquidity-constrained, that is, lower than the fundamental value.
In the case of no asset sales or a liquid market, the liquidation value of the ￿rm is equal
to its fundamental value and there is no distortion of investment decisions made at the
￿rst date. On the other hand, in the case of an illiquid market the ￿rm￿ s value is liquidity-
constrained and this will lead to distortions in the decisions made at the ￿rst date. The form
this distortion takes is quite intuitive. Firms adjust their investment decisions, that is the
project they choose, so that less ouput appears when they are in default (and forced to sell it
at ￿re sale prices) and more when they are solvent and their creditors are able to buy up the
assets of bankrupt ￿rms cheaply. In other words, they will choose more liquid projects, that
produce more in the second period and less in the third period. Both tendencies reduce the
roundaboutness of production and increase the liquidity of the asset market in the second
period but at the same time distort investment decisions.
Even though there is no intrinsic aggregate uncertainty in the model, we show that it
2Since there is a representative consumer, the incompleteness of asset markets imposes no e⁄ective con-
straint on the allocation of consumption.
3is possible to have endogenous ￿nancial crises as the result of purely extrinsic uncertainty
(sunspots). Suppose that, at the beginning of the second period, agents observe the realiza-
tion of a sunspot variable that a⁄ects the equilibrium asset price. With some probability, the
market value of late producing ￿rms is high and equal to the fundamental value, in which
case there is no default, and with some probability the asset price collapses and late pro-
ducers are forced to default. Suppose the probability that the price equals the fundamental
is high. Investment decisions will then give little weight to the possibility of making capital
gains when the asset price falls and, hence, will give little weight to providing liquidity to
the asset market in the second period. This sets up the conditions for a self-ful￿lling collapse
in the asset price: a fall in the asset price causes ￿rms to default, this triggers demand for
liquidity (through asset sales), but since the supply of liquidity is small, market clearing can
only be restored by a large drop in the price at which assets can be sold. The probability of
a collapse is small but, if it occurs, its e⁄ects are extreme.
Having shown how market failures arise, we attempt to clarify the source of the ine¢ -
ciency of equilibrium. We do this by considering three alternative ways in which the e¢ ciency
of competitive equilibria can be restored. First, we show that the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c
contingent securities removes the possibility of default and liquidation and makes the liquid-
ity constraint always redundant. The introduction of such securities amounts, in e⁄ect, to
completing the market. Secondly, the removal of the cash-in-advance constraint present in
the event of default (for instance by allowing the payment of creditors with IOUs) ensures
that the market clearing price in the asset market is always equal to the fundamental value
of the ￿rm. Finally, we show how the distortion of investment decisions can be corrected
by the use of Pigovian taxes, that tax the adoption of more liquid projects and allow so to
correct the distortion caused by liquidity-constrained asset prices.
Related literature. The e⁄ect of liquidity on asset prices and its role as a source of
￿nancial crises has been studied by numerous authors. The e⁄ect of ￿cash in the market
pricing￿in banking crises was ￿rst studied by Allen and Gale (1994) and related themes
have been pursued in a series of papers (see, for example, Allen and Gale, 1978, 2004a and
2004b). Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001, 2005) also study liquidity in a banking context.
By contrast, we focus on a purely market based economy in which there are no depository
institutions and ￿rms take production decisions entirely ￿nanced by the issue of debt. Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) argued that the most likely buyers of the assets of a bankrupt ￿rm would
be other ￿rms in the same industry. Since all ￿rms would likely be a⁄ected by the same
negative business cycle shocks, asset prices are likely to be low when a ￿rm has to be
liquidated. They did not study the general equilibrium e⁄ects of default or allow for other
methods of ￿nancing asset sales.
Liquidity also a⁄ects the ￿rms￿investment decisions in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997,
2001), who study models where moral hazard limits the pledgeable income of ￿rms. To ensure
￿rms￿access to funds, the constraint that an appropriate share of the ￿rms￿investment is in
￿ liquid￿ , or pledgeable assets is thus imposed. In such framework, the ￿rm￿ s future valuation
plays then no role for its current investment decisions, the role of liquidity is also di⁄erent and
4the liquidity needs are exogenous, only the liquidity premium is endogenously determined.
Finally, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study the e⁄ect of ￿ uctuations in the value of collateral
on the ￿rm￿ s ability to access liquidity.
The possibility of default in competitive environments is also investigated in various
recent papers (see Kehoe and Levine (1993), Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) for the
￿rst contributions). Some important di⁄erences from our paper are the facts that default
arises from a limited commitment problem (hence is also present when markets are complete)
and liquidity issues play no role in the payments received by creditors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The primitives of the economy considered
are laid out in Section 2. The investment and portfolio choices of ￿rms and consumers are
described in Section 3, together with the decisions concerning the renegotiation of debt
and default and the ￿rms￿ liquidation process. Competitive equilibria are then de￿ned
and some properties of consumers￿and ￿rms￿choices determined. This allows to obtain
a simpler set of equilibrium conditions that is useful in the rest of the analysis. Section 4
characterizes the parameter values for which e¢ cient equilibria exist. Since an equilibrium is
shown to always exist, the complementary set of parameters can only support an ine¢ cient
equilibrium. The properties of these equilibria are analyzed in more detail in Section 5,
where we show the consequences of the scarcity of liquidity. Here we also investigate the
existence of ine¢ cient sunspot equilibria. Finally, in Section 6, we show that e¢ ciency can
be restored by introducing new markets or using tax-transfer schemes. Some of the proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Environment
Time is divided into three dates, indexed by t = 0;1;2. At each date, there is a single good
that can be used for consumption or investment. Investment and ￿nancing decisions are
made at the ￿rst date (t = 0); consumption and production occur at the second and third
dates (t = 1;2).
There is a large number of identical consumers (strictly speaking, a non-atomic continuum
with unit measure), each of whom has an endowment e = (1;0;0) consisting of one unit of
the good at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2. The utility of the representative consumer
is denoted by u(c1;c2) and de￿ned by
u(c1;c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2);
for any consumption stream (c1;c2) ￿ 0. The period utility functions u1 (￿) and u2 (￿) have
the usual properties: they are continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing, and concave.
The good can be invested in risky projects at date 0 to produce outputs of the good
at dates 1 and 2. The only uncertainty concerns the timing of production. Each project
requires one unit of the good at date 0 and produces output at one and only one of the future
dates t = 1;2. With probability ￿ > 0 the output appears at date 1 and with probability
51 ￿ ￿ > 0 it appears at date 2. The probability ￿ is constant and the same for all projects.
Since there is a large number of independent projects, we assume that the ￿law of large
numbers￿is satis￿ed, meaning that the fraction of projects producing at date 1 is precisely
￿.
A project is described by an ordered pair a ￿ (a1;a2), where a1 is the amount of the
good produced at date 1 and a2 is the amount produced at date 2. The set of available
projects is de￿ned by a smooth production possibility frontier a2 = ’(a1), that is, the
project a = (a1;a2) is feasible if and only if
0 ￿ a1 ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ a2 ￿ ’(a1);
where ’(￿) satis￿es the usual properties: it is continuously di⁄erentiable, decreasing and
strictly concave on (0;1), satis￿es the boundary condition ’(1) = 0 and the Inada conditions
lim
a1!0’
0 (a1) = 0 and lim
a1!1’
0 (a1) = ￿1:
Projects are operated by ￿rms owned by entrepreneurs3. More speci￿cally, there is as-
sumed to be a large number of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each of whom can undertake a
single project requiring the investment of one unit of the good at date 0. Entrepreneurs have
no resources of their own and consumers cannot undertake investment projects themselves, so
projects are undertaken by ￿rms and ￿nanced by consumers. The number of entrepreneurs
is assumed to be greater than the number of consumers, so the number of entrepreneurs
willing to undertake a project is greater than the number of projects that can be ￿nanced by
consumers. This ￿free entry￿assumption ensures that ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium.
Given that entrepreneurs earn zero pro￿ts in equilibrium, in characterizing Pareto-e¢ cient
allocations we restrict our attention to allocations where all the projects￿output goes to the
consumers. At a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient allocation all endowments are invested at date
0 in feasible projects whose output maximizes the expected utility of the representative con-
sumer. In addition, since ’ is strictly concave, Pareto e¢ ciency requires that all endowments
be invested in a unique type of project.
Suppose that a project a is chosen at date 0. At each date t = 1;2, consumption equals
total output. Total output at date 1 is equal to ￿a1 since a fraction ￿ of the projects produce
a1 at date 1; similarly, consumption at date 2 is equal to (1 ￿ ￿)a2 since a fraction 1 ￿ ￿
of projects produce a2 at date 2. Thus, the representative consumer consumes ￿a1 at date
1 and (1 ￿ ￿)a2 at date 2. We say that a project a￿ supports a symmetric, Pareto-e¢ cient
allocation if it maximizes
u(c1;c2) = u1(￿a1) + u2 ((1 ￿ ￿)a2):
among the set of feasible projects. The Inada conditions imply that the e¢ cient project must
have positive output at each date t = 1;2; that is, 0 < a￿
1 < 1. Thus, a￿ is Pareto-e¢ cient if





1) + (1 ￿ ￿)u
0





1) = 0: (1)
3In what follows, we use the terms ￿rm and entrepreneur interchangeably.
6The e¢ cient allocation is illustrated in Figure 1.
￿ Figure 1 here ￿
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Overview
We make the extreme assumption that short-term debt is the only ￿nancial instrument
available in the economy. A bond issued at date 0 is a promise to pay one unit of the good at
the beginning of date 1. Entrepreneurs issue bonds, collateralized by future output, to ￿nance
their investment in risky projects. They make their production and ￿nancing decisions to
maximize their ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts. Consumers purchase bonds issued by entrepreneurs to ￿nance
their future consumption. They choose the type of bonds that maximizes their expected
utility, given the entrepreneurs￿choice of project and the market price of the bonds.
Since projects are risky and the promised return on debt is non-contingent, entrepreneurs
may not have enough resources to ful￿l their debt obligations at date 1. In that event they
may have to default. The institution of bankruptcy requires the resolution of the defaulted
debt by means of an immediate payment to creditors in cash and not in the form of claims
to future payments. The entrepreneurs whose projects produce output at date 1 (early
producers) can make an immediate payment. The others (late producers) have no income
readily available. They can avoid default by renegotiating the debt with their creditors and
rolling it over to the next period. If they fail to renegotiate the debt, however, they must
declare bankruptcy and liquidate the ￿rm￿ s assets (i.e., its claims on future roduction) by
selling them in the asset market. The proceeds of this sale are used to repay creditors.
To clarify the timing of these events and their consequences, we divide the second date into
three sub-periods, labelled A, B, and C, corresponding to the three phases of the bankruptcy
process, repayment/renegotiation/default, liquidation and resolution, respectively. In sub-
period A, each entrepreneur discovers whether he is an early or late producer. If he is an early
producer, he immediately pays his creditors. If he is a late producer, he either renegotiates
the debt (i.e., rolls it over) or defaults. Late producers who fail to renegotiate their debt sell
the ￿rms￿assets in the market that opens in sub-period B. The liquidated value of these
￿rms is paid to the creditors, up to the nominal value of their debt, in sub-period C. This
time line is illustrated in Figure 2.
￿ Figure 2 here ￿
The process of renegotiation and bankruptcy in￿ uences the actual payo⁄to bondholders
and hence the value of the debt associated with di⁄erent types of projects. In particular,
it implies that the value of the debt at date 0 will depend on the value at date 1 of claims
to date-2 output. The entrepreneurs￿choice of project and the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
allocation may also be a⁄ected.
7At date 1, consumers have to decide whether to use any of the income they receive from
early producers to purchase the assets of the liquidated ￿rms in sub-period B and, in so
doing, transfer this income to the ￿nal period. At date 2, the bonds issued at date 1 pay o⁄
and there is no further trade.
Markets are competitive and prices set at a level such that markets clear in equilibrium.
In particular, at date 0, the supply of bonds issued by entrepreneurs equals the demand by
consumers. Similarly at date 1 the supply of bonds by defaulting entrepreneurs is equal to
the consumers￿demand.
In the remainder of this section we provide a more precise statement of the equilibrium
conditions at the same time as deriving some basic equilibrium properties. By the end of the
section we will have derived the reduced-form set of equilibrium equations that we analyze
in the sections that follow. In Section 3.2, we provide a precise account of the renegotiation
game between ￿rms and their creditors that determines whether the debt can be paid o⁄ or
renegotiated and rolled over, or the ￿rm is forced to default. We show that the renegotiation
game results in default if and only if the present value of the ￿rm￿ s revenue stream is less
than the face value of its debt. In Section 3.3, we summarize the creditors￿payo⁄s in each
of the situations that can arise at date 1. Having characterized the outcome at date 1,
taking as given the entrepreneurs￿decisions at date 0, in Section 3.4 we proceed to analyze
the entrepreneur￿ s problem, which is to raise ￿nance and choose a production plan that
maximizes the value of his ￿rm. The value of the ￿rm depends on the consumers￿marginal
valuation for consumption at each future date, on the market price of bonds at date 1, and
on the possibility of default. Once the entrepreneur has made his ￿nancial and production
decisions at date 0, his future actions are all determined. It remains to characterize the
behavior of consumers, which we do in Section 3.5. At the ￿rst date, consumers inelastically
supply their funds to the ￿rms that o⁄er the best returns. At date 1, they make the optimal
consumption and savings decision, taking the bond price and the ￿rms￿payouts and defaults
as given. The last step in our characterization of equilibrium is the statement of the market-
clearing conditions, in Section 3.6.
3.2 Renegotiation and default
Consider an entrepreneur who invested 1 unit of the good at date 0, issued debt with a
face value of d0 > 0 and chose the project a = (a1;a2). At the beginning of date 1, the
entrepreneur learns whether he is an early producer who receives output a1 at date 1 or a
late producer who receives output a2 at date 2.
Sub-period A: repayment/renegotiation/default. Payments on debt obligations are
due in this ￿rst sub-period. There are two cases to be analyzed, depending on whether the
￿rm￿ s output appears in the present or in the future.
Early producers: An early producer receives a revenue of a1 at the beginning of date
1. If the face value of the short-term debt is less than or equal to his revenue (d0 ￿ a1), the
entrepreneur is solvent and immediately pays the amount d0 to his creditors. On the other
hand, if the face value of the debt is greater than his revenue (a1 < d0), the entrepreneur is
8insolvent. In this case he defaults and pays as much as he can (i.e., a1) to the bond holders.
Since the project￿ s future output is zero no further payment can be made.
Thus, an early producer, whether he is solvent or not, makes a payment minfa1;d0g to
the bond holders in sub-period A.
Late producers: A late producer has no current output, but expects to receive a2 in
the next period. To avoid default, he must renegotiate or ￿roll over￿ the debt d0. The
renegotiation procedure is structured as follows. The entrepreneur makes a ￿take it or leave
it￿o⁄er to the bond holders, o⁄ering to exchange new short-term debt with a face value
of d1 for the old debt d0 issued at date 0. Once the entrepreneur has made an o⁄er, the
creditors simultaneously accept or reject it. The renegotiation succeeds if a majority of the
creditors accept and the entrepreneur can a⁄ord to pay o⁄ the bond holders who reject the
o⁄er. Otherwise it fails and the entrepreneur is forced to default and to liquidate his ￿rm￿ s
assets, giving the proceeds to his creditors. All this has to be done before the end of the
current period (date 1).
Sub-period B: liquidation. In this sub-period the market for the assets of defaulting late
producers opens. The only asset these entrepreneurs possess is their claim to the project￿ s
future output. Since there is no uncertainty about the amount of future output, this claim
can be realized by issuing riskless debt, fully collateralized by the future output. The debt
trades at a uniform price q1 regardless of the ￿rm￿ s project since there is no default risk.
Sub-period C: resolution. At the end of date 1, bankrupt late producers settle their debts
by distributing the liquidated value of their projects, q1a2, pro rata among their creditors.
Because of the timing of default, liquidation, and resolution, there is a marked asymmetry
between early and late producers in default. If an early producer defaults in sub-period A,
he immediately hands over his output a1 in partial payment of his debt. Defaulting late
producers are in a di⁄erent situation. Because they have no current revenue, they must
liquidate their assets in sub-period B before making any payment to their creditors. So
these are forced to wait until sub-period C for payment. The delay is important because
income received from liquidation in sub-period C cannot be used to purchase bonds in sub-
period B. This can a⁄ect the equilibrium price of bonds q1 which in turn will a⁄ect the
amount, minfq1a2;d0g, that the creditors eventually receive.
The renegotiation game
Now that we have described the sequence of events at date 1, we can analyze the outcome
of the renegotiation process between a late producer and the bond holders who ￿nanced his
project. Suppose that, for the entrepreneur in question, the chosen project is a = (a1;a2)
and the face value of debt is d0.
The renegotiation game consists of two stages:
￿ The entrepreneur makes a ￿take it or leave it￿o⁄er d1 ￿ a2 to the bond holders.
￿ The bond holders simultaneously accept or reject the ￿rm￿ s o⁄er.
9Two conditions must be satis￿ed in order for the renegotiation to succeed.
(i) First, a majority of the bond holders must accept the o⁄er.
(ii) Secondly, the rest of the bond holders must be paid o⁄ in full. Hence, if a fraction
￿ > 0:5 of bond holders accept they must be paid d1 at date 2, while the remaining
fraction 1￿￿ must be paid d0 at date 1 in sub-period A. This is feasible if the budget
constraint
￿q1d1 + (1 ￿ ￿)d0 ￿ q1a2
is satis￿ed.
If either condition is not satis￿ed, the renegotiation fails and the entrepreneur is forced to
default, liquidate the project, and distribute the proceeds to the bond holders at the end of
the period.
If a bond holder accepts the o⁄er and renegotiation succeeds, he receives d1 at date 2.
If he rejects the o⁄er and renegotiation still succeeds, he must be paid d0 immediately, i.e.,
in sub-period A. If renegotiation fails, the bond holder receives minfq1a2;d0g at the end of
date 1, regardless of whether he accepts or rejects. Let (c1;c2) be the consumption pro￿le
of the representative consumer. In equilibrium each consumer holds a negligible amount of
the debt issued by any ￿rm, to fully diversify ￿rm speci￿c risk, so his payo⁄s for accepting















If the consumer rejects a successful o⁄er, he can choose to consume his payment d0 at date 1
or he can invest it in bonds and consume d0=q1 at date 2. Thus, his payo⁄ is the maximum
of u0
1 (d0)d0 and u0
2 (c2)d0=q1. This gives us the entry in the lower left hand cell. The others
are self-explanatory.
The subgame given by the second stage of the renegotiation game has some of the features
of a coordination game, so it is not surprising that there may be multiple equilibria. In
particular, if a majority of bond holders rejects the entrepreneur￿ s o⁄er, renegotiation fails
and the individual bond holder receives the same payo⁄ whether he accepts or rejects the
o⁄er. Thus, there is always an equilibrium of the subgame in which all bond holders reject
the o⁄er, renegotiation fails, and the project is liquidated prematurely.
There is also a pure-strategy equilibrium of this subgame in which renegotiation succeeds
if and only if
u
0










that is, the payo⁄ from accepting the entrepreneur￿ s o⁄er, conditional on success, is at least
as great as the payo⁄ from rejecting it. In what follows, we will consider the case where
10renegotiation fails only if it is unavoidable. That is, bond holders are assumed to accept the
o⁄er if acceptance is optimal when everyone else accepts. This minimizes the incidence of





1(c1) denote the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, condition
(2) can be equivalently written as:
d0 ￿ minfM (c);q1gd1:
In analyzing the renegotiation game, it is convenient to anticipate a property of the equilibria
of the economy that we establish later. For the moment, we treat this property as an auxiliary
assumption:
q1 ￿ M(c): (3)
Condition (3) implies that, in equilibrium, consumers might want to purchase more riskless





there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in which the entrepreneur
o⁄ers d1 = d0=q1 and the creditors all accept. If
(b)
d0 > q1a2;
there is no equilibrium in which renegotiation succeeds: in every subgame perfect equilibrium
of the renegotiation game the entrepreneur is forced to default and liquidate the project.
Proof. (a) The proof is constructive. Suppose that the creditors￿strategy is to accept o⁄ers
d1 ￿ d￿
1 ￿ d0=q1 and reject o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1 and the entrepreneur￿ s strategy is to o⁄er d1 = d￿
1.
We claim that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We begin by showing that the strategy of an individual creditor is a best response to the
strategies of the other creditors and the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 ￿ d￿
1,
all the other creditors accept the o⁄er and renegotiation succeeds even if the creditor under
consideration rejects. Hence, the creditor receives d1 ￿ d￿
1 at date 2 if he accepts the o⁄er
and d0=q1 = d￿
1 at date 2 if he rejects it. So it is (weakly) optimal to accept the o⁄er. If
the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1, all the other creditors reject the o⁄er, so the renegotiation
fails and the bond holder under consideration receives the same payo⁄ whether he accepts
or rejects. So rejecting the o⁄er is (weakly) optimal in this case.
It remains to show that the entrepreneur￿ s strategy is a best response to the creditors￿
strategy. If the entrepreneur o⁄ers d1 = d￿
1 his o⁄er is accepted, he pays out d￿
1 = d0=q1 at
date 2, and his ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is a2 ￿ d0=q1 ￿ 0. Any o⁄er d1 2 (d￿
1;a2] will also be accepted,
but clearly yields lower pro￿ts. On the other hand, if he o⁄ers d1 < d￿
1, the o⁄er will be
11rejected, he is forced to default and ends up paying out minfq1a2;d0g at the end of date 1.
By assumption, d0 ￿ q1a2 so minfq1a2;d0g = d0 and the payment under default leaves the
entrepreneur a non-negative pro￿t q1a2 ￿ d0 at date 1. Since the present value at date 1 of
the expression we found for the pro￿ts when d1 = d￿
1 is also q1a2 ￿d0, the entrepreneur does
not gain by o⁄ering d1 < d￿
1 either. This completes the proof that the strategies constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(b) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which the renegotiation succeeds. Then it must be optimal for creditors to accept an o⁄er
d1 ￿ a2. But this cannot be, since by rejecting the o⁄er (when everyone else accepts) a
creditor obtains d0=q1 > a2 ￿ d1 at date 2.
3.3 Payments to bond holders
In the preceding analysis we have seen that a bond issued at date 0 yields di⁄erent payments,
depending on whether the entrepreneur turns out to be an early or late producer and whether
early or late producers default. These payments are displayed in the table below.
Payment if d0 ￿ q1a2
(late producers solvent)
Payment if d0 > q1a2
(late producers default)
Early producer minfa1;d0g at date 1 minfa1;d0g at date 1
Late producer d0=q1 at date 2 q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
If the entrepreneur is a late producer and d0 > q1a2, renegotiation always fails, as shown in
Proposition 1. Hence the entrepreneur defaults and pays creditors an amount minfq1a2;d0g =
q1a2. The other cases are self-explanatory.
A bond issued at date 0 is identi￿ed by its face value d0 and the project a it ￿nances.
The bond market at date 0 is competitive. For any feasible project a, let V (a;d0) denote the
market value of debt with face value d0 issued to ￿nance project a. Given the presence of a
representative consumer, in equilibrium V (a;d0) equals the ratio of the consumer￿ s marginal
utility of the payo⁄ from a unit investment in a bond of type (a;d0) to his marginal utility
of income at date 0.
3.4 Production and ￿nancing decisions
Now we can describe the entrepreneur￿ s production and ￿nancing decisions. Taking the price
function V (￿) as given, the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem consists of choosing an admissible
project a and face value of the debt d0 to maximize his ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts4:
maxa;d0 maxfV (a;d0) ￿ 1;0g
s.t. 0 ￿ a1 ￿ 1; 0 ￿ a2 ￿ ’(a1) : (4)
4The entrepreneur, the sole owner of the ￿rm, is assumed to be risk neutral. His welfare is clearly
maximized by the pro￿t-maximizing choice of (a;d0).
12Equivalently, we can interpret this problem as maximizing the value of the debt issued. Since
entrepreneurs have no resources of their own and there is limited liability, the ￿rm￿ s revenue
can never be negative. The speci￿cation of the objective function in (4) re￿ ects the fact
that, if the value of the debt issued is lower than the cost of the initial investment, that is,
V (a;d0) < 1, it will be impossible for the entrepreneur to undertake a project at all and he
will be forced to remain inactive.
As we argued in Section 2, free entry by entrepreneurs ensures that ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts
in equilibrium. This fact is helpful in studying the solutions to the entrepreneurs￿problem
(4). The zero-pro￿t condition implies that, for all (a;d0),
V (a;d0) ￿ 1 (5)
and, for all projects whose initial investment can be ￿nanced, that is, ordered pairs (a;d0)
satisfying V (a;d0) = 1, the face value of the debt d0 must satisfy
d0 ￿ maxfa1;q1a2g: (6)
Condition (6) says that the entrepreneur has no revenue left after paying bond holders,
whether he is an early producer or a late producer. When he is an early producer, d0 ￿ a1
implies that the face value of the debt is at least as great as his ￿rm￿ s revenue. When he is
a late producer, d0 ￿ q1a2 ensures that either he defaults and pays out minfd0;q1a2g = q1a2
at (the end of) date 1 or (when d0 = q1a2) he renegotiates the debt and pays out d0=q1 = a2
at date 2. In either case, his ￿rm realizes zero pro￿t.
We show, in addition, that
Lemma 1 The value of the ￿rm￿ s debt, and hence its pro￿ts, are always maximized by
setting
d0 = maxfa1;q1a2g: (7)
Proof. We show that, if d0 > maxfa1;q1a2g, a reduction in d0 has either has no e⁄ect or
increases V (a;q0). We consider two cases in turn. If
a1 > q1a2
the payments to bond holders, and hence the bond￿ s value, are the same whether d0 = a1
or d0 > a1, because default by early producers makes no di⁄erence to the outcome and late
producers must default in any case. If
a1 ￿ q1a2;
late producers do not default if d0 = q1a2 whereas they must default if d0 > q1a2. Hence,
the payment to bond holders is a2 at date 2 in the ￿rst case and q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
in the second. Under (3), u0
2 (c2)a2 ￿ u0
1 (c1)q1a2, and the inequality is strict if q1 < M (c).
13Thus, the value of the debt is at least as high in the case where d0 = q1a2 as it is in the case
where d0 > q1a2 and is strictly higher if q1 < M (c).
In the sequel we restrict our attention to the case where, for any project the entrepreneur
considers undertaking in equilibrium, the face value of the debt issued satis￿es (7). On this
basis, the speci￿cation of the payo⁄s for bondholders obtained in Section 3.3 can be further
simpli￿ed:
(i) if a1 ￿ q1a2, we have:
- d0 = q1a2
- early producers default and pay a1 at date 1
- late producers are solvent and pay a2 at date 2.
(ii) if a1 > q1a2:
- d0 = a1,
- early producers are solvent and pay a1 at date 1
- late producers default and pay q1a2 at (the end of) date 1
Note that the possibility of default introduces a discontinuity in payo⁄s and hence a non-
convexity into the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem. For this reason, we divide the analysis of
the entrepreneur￿ s decision into two parts, depending on whether the late producer is solvent
or in default. Each case corresponds to a convex sub-problem.
(i) Late producers solvent Consider ￿rst projects such that q1a2 ￿ a1. In this case, as
we argued above, creditors receive a1 at date 1 with probability ￿ and a2 at date 2 with
probability 1￿￿. They can use the payment received at date 1 for immediate consumption or
to purchase bonds for future consumption, whichever gives them the greater utility. Because
of our auxiliary assumption, q1 ￿ M (c), it is always weakly optimal at the margin to save the
payment until date 2. Hence, the market value of the debt issued to ￿nance these projects,










2 (c2)(1 ￿ ￿)a2
￿
; (8)
where ￿ > 0 denotes the marginal utility of consumption at date 0.5
5This expression and the next one ensure, as we will see, that for every type of bond (a;d0), V (a;d0)
is a market-clearing price. Alternatively, we can interpret V (a;d0) as an entrepreneur￿ s rational conjecture
about how much money he can raise by issuing short-term debt (a;d0).
14(ii) Late producers in default For projects such that q1a2 < a1, the entrepreneur de-
faults when he is a late producer. Bond holders again receive a1 at date 1 with probability
￿, but now they get a payment q1a2 at the end of date 1 with probability 1￿￿. In the ￿rst
event, we can again suppose without loss of generality that the payment received at date 1
is saved until date 2. Then the market value of the debt issued at date 0 with face value










1 (c1)(1 ￿ ￿)q1a2
￿
: (9)
We can formalize the properties of the entrepreneurs￿decision in the following claim.
Claim 1 In a competitive equilibrium where (some) entrepreneurs are active, each entrepre-
neur chooses an admissible project ￿ a which solves his decision problem (4), where V (a;d0)
is given by (8) for projects such that q1a2 ￿ a1 and by (9) for projects such that q1a2 < a1.
In addition,
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1;q1￿ a2g) = 1 and V (a;maxfa1;q1a2g) ￿ 1
for any other feasible project a.
Given the non-convexity of the ￿rms￿choice problem, it is possible that an array of
projects is chosen in equilibrium. To keep the notation simple, however, we stated both
the above claim and the following characterization of equilibrium for the symmetric case in
which all entrepreneurs choose the same project a.6
3.5 The consumer￿ s decision
At date 0, consumers supply their endowments in exchange for bonds. The price function
V (￿) speci￿ed in (8) and (9) ensures that, provided c is the representative consumer￿ s optimal
consumption plan and ￿ his marginal utility of income at date 0, he is willing to ￿nance any
project a the entrepreneurs may choose. More precisely, for any (a;d0), consumers are willing
to purchase bonds with value V (a;d0) at date 0 from any entrepreneur who chooses a project
a and issues bonds with face value d0.
The consumer￿ s problem at date 2 is trivial, because there is no further trade and the
consumer simply consumes all his income. It remains to analyze his choice problem at date
1, when the consumer has to decide how much of his current income to use for immediate
consumption and how much to save in the form of short-term debt. In particular, we need
to verify that condition (3), which we have used as an auxiliary assumption, actually holds
in equilibrium.
The consumer￿ s decision problem at date 1 di⁄ers according to whether late producers
are solvent or in default. As in the previous section, we consider each case in turn.
6The general case, with an array of projects chosen in equilibrium, is described in the appendix.
15(i) Late producers solvent: d0 = q1a2 ￿ a1 In this case, as we saw, the early producers
pay out a1 in sub-period A of date 1, and the late producers roll over their debt and pay out
a2 at date 2. Each consumer receives a deterministic payment7 equal to ￿a1 in sub-period A.
This income can be used to purchase b1 units of bonds in sub-period B. Since the consumer
receives no further payment in sub-period C, the remaining income, ￿a1 ￿ q1b1, constitutes
the maximal amount he can spend on consumption at date 1. At date 2, the consumer￿ s
income will be (1 ￿ ￿)a2 + b1 and will be entirely devoted to consumption.
Thus, the consumer￿ s problem at date 1 is to choose a consumption plan c = (c1;c2) and
bond holding b1 to solve
max(c1;c2)￿0; b1 u1 (c1) + u2 (c2)
s.t. q1b1 ￿ ￿a1
c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1
c2 = (1 ￿ ￿)a2 + b1:
(10)
It is clear that in this case the liquidity constraint, q1b1 ￿ ￿a1, requiring that the expenditure
on bonds does not exceed the consumer￿ s available income, is implied by the date-1 budget
constraint, c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1, and the condition c1 ￿ 0. Then the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for (c1;c2) and b1 to be a solution of the consumer￿ s decision problem are the
two budget constraints, i.e., the second and third constraints in (10), and the ￿rst-order
condition
q1 = M (c): (11)
(ii) Late producers in default: d0 = a1 > q1a2 The only di⁄erence for the consumer
with respect to the previous case is that he now receives no payment at date 2, but instead
receives an amount (1 ￿ ￿)q1a2 in sub-period C of date 1. Hence the income available to
buy bonds when the bond market opens is still equal to ￿a1 while the income which can be
used for consumption is now ￿a1 + (1 ￿ ￿)q1a2 ￿ q1b1 at date 1 and b1 at date 2. Hence,
the consumer￿ s problem at date 1 is to choose a consumption plan c and bond holding b1 to
solve
max(c1;c2)￿0; b1 u1 (c1) + u2 (c2)
s.t. q1b1 ￿ ￿a1
c1 = ￿a1 ￿ q1b1 + q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2
c2 = b1:
(12)
In this case, the liquidity constraint is no longer redundant. The necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for (c1;c2) and b1 to be an optimum are the three constraints in (12) and the
￿rst-order condition
q1 ￿ M (c); (13)
where the inequality (13) is strict only when the liquidity constraint is binding, i.e., q1b1 =
￿a1. When q1 < M (c), the consumer would like to save more, but is unable to use the
7This follows from the fact that, as already said, in equilibrium each consumer holds a negligible amount
of the debt issued by any entrepreneur and all projects are independent, so the law of large numbers applies.
16payment q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2 he anticipates receiving in sub-period C as collateral in order to borrow
the cash needed in sub-period B to purchase additional short-term debt.
Note that the ￿rst-order conditions (11) and (13) imply that our earlier auxiliary as-
sumption (3) will indeed be satis￿ed in equilibrium.
3.6 Market clearing
Now we are ready to put together the di⁄erent elements of the model to de￿ne an equilibrium.
An equilibrium consists of a project ￿ a chosen by entrepreneurs, a consumption plan ￿ c chosen
by consumers (with the implied value ￿ ￿ of the marginal utility of date-0 income), and prices
V (￿) and ￿ q1 for the bonds issued, respectively, at dates 0 and 1 such that markets clear.
Market clearing at date 0 requires the entrepreneurs￿supply of bonds to equal consumers￿
demand. As anticipated in the previous section, the speci￿cation of the bond-price function
V (￿) in (8) and (9), with
￿
￿ q1;￿ c; ￿ ￿
￿
as above, together with Claim 1, ensure market clearing
holds if
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1; ￿ q1￿ a2g) = 1:
The market value of the debt issued allows entrepreneurs to raise just enough funds to ￿nance
the projects they have chosen.
Since markets do not re-open at date 2, the only other market-clearing condition concerns
the bond market at date 1. The speci￿cation of the market-clearing condition again depends
on whether late producers are solvent or in default when they choose project ￿ a and the bond
price is ￿ q1.
If late producers are solvent, they will roll over their debt, o⁄ering short-term debt with
a face value of d1 = ￿ a2 to the bond holders. So, when the bond market opens in sub-period
B, they have no need to issue new debt and there is no supply of bonds in the market. In
equilibrium, the bond price must be such that the consumers￿demand for bonds equals zero.
In other words,
(￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and ￿ b1 = 0: (14)
must be a solution of problem (10). This is the case if and only if ￿ q1 = M(￿ c), so that the
consumers￿￿rst-order condition (11) is satis￿ed.
The more interesting case is the one in which late producers are forced to default, package
their claims to future output as collateralized debt, and supply bonds with face value d1 = ￿ a2
when the market opens in sub-period B. In equilibrium, consumers must now demand a
positive amount of bonds, that is,
(￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and ￿ b1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2 (15)
must solve (12). This happens if the consumers￿￿rst-order condition (13) holds. The ￿rst-
order condition takes two possible forms, according to whether the liquidity constraint ￿ q1￿ b1 ￿
￿￿ a1 holds as an equality or as an inequality. In the ￿rst case, the liquidity constraint is
binding and we have ￿ q1￿ b1 = ￿￿ a1 and ￿ q1 ￿ M(￿ c); in the second case, we have ￿ q1 = M(￿ c) and
17￿ q1￿ b1 < ￿￿ a1. These two conditions are equivalent to:8
￿ q1 = min
￿
￿￿ a1




We can now state the de￿nition of a symmetric competitive equilibrium (with nonzero
output), that is, an equilibrium in which (some) entrepreneurs are active and choose the
same value of (a;d0).
De￿nition 1 A (symmetric) competitive equilibrium consists of a project ￿ a, a corre-
sponding consumption stream (￿ c1;￿ c2) = (￿￿ a1;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2) and a date-1 price of the bond ￿ q1
such that (a) ￿ a solves the entrepreneur￿ s problem (4) when V (￿) is given by (8) and (9); (b)
the bond market clears at date 0,
V (￿ a;maxf￿ a1; ￿ q1￿ a2g) = 1;
and (c) the bond market clears at date 1,
￿ q1 =
(




(1￿￿)￿ a2;M (￿ c)
o
otherwise.
Given the non-convexities in the entrepreneur￿ s decision problem, a symmetric equilib-
rium may not always exist. So we can only prove the existence of an equilibrium in general
if we allow for the possibility that an array of projects is chosen. In that case, we say the
equilibrium is mixed.
Proposition 2 Under the stated assumptions on consumers￿preferences and the technology,
a (possibly mixed) competitive equilibrium always exists.
4 When are equilibria e¢ cient?
Now that we have derived a reduced form characterization of equilibrium, we are ready to
analyze its e¢ ciency. In this section we determine the conditions under which the unique
(symmetric) e¢ cient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium. We will ￿nd that this
happens under two quite di⁄erent circumstances. The ￿rst one is when an equilibrium exists
where early producers default and late producers roll over their debt to the third and ￿nal
8This can be seen by noticing that the ￿rst condition can be restated as
￿ q1 = M (￿ c) <
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
:
and the second one as
￿ q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
￿ M (￿ c):
18period. In such equilibrium, there is no trade in the asset markets in the middle period and
the equilibrium supply of liquidity is then irrelevant. The second one is when we have an
equilibrium where early producers are solvent and late producers default, but the supply of
liquidity is su¢ ciently high that assets trade at their fundamental value. These two cases
exhaust the possibilities for supporting an e¢ cient allocation as a competitive equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section, we use the reduced-form characterization of equilibrium in
De￿nition 1 to identify the parameter values for which these cases obtain.
From De￿nition 1, we can partition the set of symmetric competitive equilibria according
to whether ￿ q1 = M (￿ c) or ￿ q1 < M (￿ c). In an equilibrium where ￿ q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1￿￿)￿ a2 < M (￿ c), late
producers default (￿ q1￿ a2 < ￿ a1) and the condition for an (interior) solution of the entrepreneur￿ s
problem is:
￿









Condition (17) is di⁄erent from the e¢ ciency condition (1) and, in fact, we will show that
the equilibrium is always ine¢ cient in this case. In all other equilibria we have ￿ q1 = M (￿ c)
and an (interior) solution of the ￿rm￿ s problem ￿ a satis￿es
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)M (￿ c)
= ￿’
0(￿ a1). (18)
In other words, the consumers￿MRS equals the project￿ s MRT, the same as in the e¢ ciency
condition (1). Thus, a symmetric competitive equilibrium is Pareto-e¢ cient if and only if
q1 = M (￿ c).
As shown in Section 2, the economy we have described admits a unique, symmetric,
Pareto-e¢ cient allocation, supported by the project a￿ that satis￿es equation (1) and a￿
2 =
’(a￿
1). The next result identi￿es conditions on preferences and technology under which a
Pareto-e¢ cient competitive equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3 Let a￿ be a feasible project supporting an e¢ cient allocation. This allocation
can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium if and only if either (i)
u0




























Whenever (i) or (ii) holds, we show that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists where ￿ q1 = M (c￿),9




19solves the ￿rm￿ s choice problem if it satis￿es (18), which coincides with (1). On the other


















an equilibrium supporting a￿, if it exists, must satisfy ￿ q1 < M (c￿). As we have seen above,
in such an equilibrium, a￿ is a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem only if it satis￿es (17),
which we will show is impossible. Hence we conclude that no Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium
exists in that case. Note that (19) can only hold if ￿ < 1=2.
Proof. Set
￿ q1 = M(c
￿) =
u0






In case (i) we have ￿ q1a￿
2 = M(c￿)a￿
2 ￿ a￿
1; so if entrepreneurs choose a￿ late producers are
solvent and the bond market clears with zero trade. In case (ii) M(c￿)a￿
2 < a￿
1, so if a￿ is
chosen, late producers default and the bond market again clears, since







To conclude that there is a competitive equilibrium in which project a￿ is chosen, it is only
left to prove that a￿ solves the entrepreneurs￿choice problem at ￿ q1. Note that at ￿ q1 = M(c￿);
both for a such that ￿ q1a2 < a1 (late producers default) and for a such that ￿ q1a2 ￿ a1 (early
producers default), we have










2 ((1 ￿ ￿)a
￿
2)(1 ￿ ￿)a2]:
The condition for a maximum of this expression is the same as the ￿rst-order condition for
e¢ ciency, given by (1) and clearly satis￿ed by a￿. Hence, a￿ always maximizes the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts at ￿ q1 = M(c￿) and (a￿; ￿ q1) is an equilibrium.
Next we show that the e¢ cient allocation cannot be decentralized as a competitive equi-
librium when neither (i) nor (ii) holds, that is under (19). The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose (a￿; ￿ q1) is an equilibrium. Then market-clearing requires
￿ q1 = min
￿
u0





















1 > ￿ q1a￿
2,
late producers default at a￿ and a￿ must then be an interior local maximum of problem (4)


















a contradiction to (19). This completes the proof of the theorem.
5 Scarce liquidity and ine¢ ciency
Proposition 3 identi￿es the parameter values for which it is possible to decentralize the
e¢ cient allocation. Since a competitive equilibrium always exists, by Proposition 2, it follows
that an ine¢ cient equilibrium exists whenever the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of
Proposition 3 are not satis￿ed. That is, when the parameters of the economy are such that
(19) holds, an ine¢ cient equilibrium must exist. What can we say about its properties? In
this section we explore a special case of the economy to get a better insight into the features
of an ine¢ cient equilibrium and, in particular, the form that the distortion of investment
decisions takes.
But ￿rst we state a general property of ine¢ cient equilibria. As we saw in the proof of
Proposition 3, when ￿ q1 = M (￿ c), the expressions for V (￿) in (8) and in (9) coincide and the
solution of the entrepreneurs￿problem (4) is always given by an e¢ cient project. Hence,
Claim 2 At any ine¢ cient equilibrium, ￿ q1 < M (￿ c) and at least a positive fraction of entre-
preneurs chooses a production plan in which late producers default.
In the rest of this section, we restrict attention to economies where consumers have a
linear utility function:
u(c1) + u2 (c2) = c1 + ￿c2: (20)
The marginal rate of substitution M(c) is then constant and equal to the subjective discount
factor ￿ > 0. As shown in the lemma below, the conditions under which e¢ cient alloca-
tions can be decentralized reduce in this case to conditions on ￿. Equilibria can then be
conveniently classi￿ed according to the value of ￿.




1)(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿=￿; (21)
and has a unique solution a￿
1(￿), where a￿
1 (￿) is a continuous function of ￿. It can immediately
be veri￿ed that a￿
1(￿) is monotonically decreasing in ￿ and that a￿
1 ! 0 as ￿ ! 1 and a￿
1 ! 1
as ￿ ! 0. Then a￿
1(￿)=’(a￿
1(￿)) is also monotonically decreasing in ￿ and tends to 1 as ￿
tends to 0. The following lemma is the analogue of Proposition 3 for preferences satisfying
(20).
Lemma 2 Suppose consumers￿preferences are given by the utility function in (20). Then
there exist positive numbers ￿
￿ and ￿
￿￿ such that:
21(i) ￿ ￿ ￿





and, in this case, there is an e¢ cient equilibrium where ￿ q1 = ￿ and late producers are solvent;
(ii) ￿ ￿ ￿





and, in this case, for all ￿ ￿ minf￿
￿;￿
￿￿g there is an e¢ cient equilibrium in which ￿ q1 = ￿
and late producers default;
(iii) ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ () ￿ < 1=2:
By Proposition 3 it also follows that for any ￿ in the region (￿
￿;￿
￿￿) ￿ non-empty if
￿ < 1=2 ￿ any equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Given our interest in ine¢ cient equilibria, we will
focus here on values of ￿ < ￿
￿￿. To characterize the properties of equilibria in this region,
we investigate ￿rst how the entrepreneurs￿optimal project varies with q1, for q1 ￿ ￿. In the
proof of the next proposition, we show that, if the optimal project is such that late producers
default, it is an interior maximum of (9), while if it is such that late producers are solvent
it is a corner solution (i.e., the solution occurs at the value ^ a1 such that ^ a1 = q1’(^ a1)). We
can then compare the maximal value of (9) and of (8) to determine which one solves the
entrepreneurs￿choice problem (4) for each q1 ￿ ￿ and, ￿nally, verify at which prices the bond
market-clearing condition is satis￿ed. In the next result we impose an additional property
on the technology ’ requiring that it be symmetric, that is: a1 = ’(a2) i⁄ a2 = ’(a1).
Proposition 4 Suppose the consumers￿utility function is as in (20), ’ is symmetric and
￿ < ￿
￿￿. If [i] ￿ > ￿
￿, all equilibria are ine¢ cient and the equilibrium set is described
by one of the following three cases : (a) there is a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which
late producers default; (b) there is a unique mixed equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose
between two production plans, at one of which late producers are solvent and at the other late
producers default; (c) there are three equilibria, one symmetric equilibrium as in a) and two
mixed equilibria as in b). On the other hand, if [ii] ￿ < ￿
￿ a unique, e¢ cient equilibrium
exists.
In all the ine¢ cient symmetric equilibria characterized in the above proposition, the
project chosen in equilibrium is such that ￿ a1 > a￿
1(￿), thus the distortion takes the form of a
project with a higher payo⁄ at date 1 than the e¢ cient project a￿. This can be viewed as a
response to the shortage of liquidity at q1 = ￿ (as we see from (19), the supply of liquidity by
consumers, equal to ￿a￿
1=￿, is strictly lower than ￿rms￿demand, (1￿￿)a￿
2); this drives down
q1 and induces entrepreneurs to choose more liquid projects, that is projects with higher
payo⁄s at date 1 to pro￿t from the higher rate of return available at that date. In mixed
equilibria we still have ￿ q1 < ￿; and a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choosing a project
such that a0
1 > a￿
1(￿), but the rest of them choose a project a00
1 < a￿
1(￿) where late producers
are solvent, which reduces the demand for liquidity at date 1. Notice that when multiple
equilibria exist, as in case (i.c), they are always Pareto-ranked.
How do the properties of the equilibria vary with ￿ in the ine¢ cient region (￿
￿;￿
￿￿)? If ￿
increases, at the e¢ cient project a￿
1 decreases while, as shown in the proof of the proposition
above, at a symmetric equilibrium ￿ a1 increases; hence the ine¢ ciency gap increases.
22Sunspot Equilibria. We show next that an additional type of ine¢ cient equilibria, where
the date-1 bond price ￿ uctuates randomly in response to the realization of a sunspot event,
might also exist. The argument is constructive and general. However, both to illustrate it
more simply and to allow a closer comparison with the properties of the equilibria charac-
terized in the ￿rst part of this section, the argument will be presented for the case where the
consumers￿utility function is linear, as in (20).
Proposition 5 Suppose the consumers￿utility function is given by (20) and ￿ > ￿
￿￿, ￿ <
1=2. For " > 0 su¢ ciently small, a sunspot equilibrium exists in which entrepreneurs choose
a project ￿ a and the bond price takes the values e q1 = ￿ and
e e q1 =
￿￿ a1
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ a2
; (22)
with probabilities 1 ￿ " and " respectively.
Proof. We will show that, for " su¢ ciently small, the entrepreneurs￿optimal choice is









+e e q1 (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
#)
(23)
subject to the constraints a1 ￿ ￿a2 and a1 > e e q1a2. That is, the entrepreneurs￿optimal
choice is given by a project such that late producers are solvent when the date 1 bond price
is e q1 = ￿ and default when it is e e q1.
Note that the maximum of ￿a1 + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1) is attained at the e¢ cient project
a￿. By Lemma 2, ￿ > ￿
￿￿ implies that ￿ > a￿
1=a￿





2] so that a￿ satis￿es the constraints of problem (23) (when e e q1 is set equal to
￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2]) and is a solution of such problem when " = 0. Since, again by Lemma 2,
￿ < 1=2 implies ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ and hence for ￿ > ￿
￿￿ we also have ￿ > ￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2], the bonds
market clearing condition (c) of De￿nition 1 is satis￿ed both when the price q1 is equal to ￿
and when it equals ￿a￿
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)a￿
2. By continuity, when " is su¢ ciently small the solution
￿ a of problem (23) above (at the corresponding value of e e q1 given by (22)) will be close to a￿
and the same properties hold.
To be able to say that ￿ a is also a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem (4) it remains
to be shown that the entrepreneur￿ s pro￿ts are also higher at ￿ a than at any other project
such that late producers default both when q1 equals ￿ and when it equals e e q1, that is, at the
maximum of





+e e q1 (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
)
(24)
10It is immediate to verify that the terms multiplying (1 ￿ ") and ", respectively, coincide with the terms
in (8) and (9) when the utility function is given by (20).
23subject to a1 > ￿a2,11 as well as at any project such that late producers never default, i.e.
at the maximum of





+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’(a1)
)
(25)
subject to the constraint a1 ￿ e e q1a2.12 For " su¢ ciently small, (24) will be maximized at a
such that a1 = ￿a2 and (25) at a such that a1 = e e q1a2, and the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts will clearly be
less than at ￿ a.
Combining the result in this proposition with the one in Lemma 2, when ￿ > ￿
￿￿ and
￿ < 1=2 at least two competitive equilibria exist, an e¢ cient one where ￿ q1 = ￿ and an
ine¢ cient sunspot equilibrium where the bond price takes the values ￿ and e e q1 < ￿, with
probabilities 1￿" and ". In the latter, the self-ful￿lling belief that the bond price will collapse
with positive probability at date 1 induces late producers to default when that happens. The
anticipation of this event leads entrepreneurs to choose a project with an ine¢ ciently high
level of output at date 1, ￿ a1 > a￿
1, to pro￿t from the low bond price at that date. For "
small, the distortion in the investment decision will also be relatively small, but the collapse
in the bond price, when it occurs, will be quite signi￿cant.
6 Restoring e¢ ciency
We have focused on the existence and characterization of ine¢ cient equilibria because of
the insights they o⁄er into the role of liquidity in market failures. To understand why the
market fails to allocate resources e¢ ciently and how the market failure might be alleviated
or avoided altogether, it is helpful to ask what changes in our set-up would ensure that
competitive equilibria are always e¢ cient. In this section, we consider three remedies that
illustrate the role of new markets and of government intervention in achieving an e¢ cient
allocation of resources.
The decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation is problematic only when late producers
default and in particular when condition (19) holds, so we focus exclusively on this case in
what follows. Letting a￿ be, as before, a project supporting a Pareto e¢ cient allocation, this














11Since for " small, by continuity, we still have ￿ > e e q1, the other constraint a1 > e e q1a2 is redundant.
12The case where late producers default at e q1 = ￿ but not at e e q1 is clearly impossible, since e q1 > e e q1.
24There are several ways to support the decentralization of the e¢ cient allocation under these
circumstances. We begin by considering the e⁄ect of introducing (￿rm-speci￿c) contingent
claims.
Completing the market.
Markets are incomplete at date 0 because it is impossible to make trades contingent on the
state of an individual ￿rm at date 1. Suppose we introduce ￿rm-speci￿c securities that pay
one unit of the good at date 1 if the entrepreneur turns out to be an early (resp. late) producer
and nothing otherwise. These securities are traded at date 0 and their prices are denoted by
q01 and q02, respectively. Now each entrepreneur is able to purchase insurance against being
an early or late producer and to avoid default if he wishes. With these additional markets,
we can show that there exists a competitive equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose the
project a￿ and the market-clearing price is q￿
1 = M (c￿).
Let b01 (respectively, b02) denote the demand for securities that pay out if the entrepreneur
is an early (respectively, late) producer. For any project a and any face value d0 of the debt
issued at date 0 to ￿nance it, an appropriate portfolio (b01;b02) can be found to ensure that
the entrepreneur￿ s total revenue in period 1 is equal to d0:
d0 = a1 + b01 = M (c
￿)a2 + b02: (26)
In other words, default never occurs. The ￿rm￿ s debt is riskless in this case and pays one
unit for sure. Let q0 be its unit price in period 0. Since all ￿rm speci￿c risk can be fully
diversi￿ed, the prices for the contingent claims are fair:
(q01;q02) = (￿q0;(1 ￿ ￿)q0): (27)
The ￿rm￿ s revenue at date 0 is now given by
q0d0 ￿ 1 ￿ (q01b01 + q02b02)
We can then substitute from (27) for the prices of the contingent claims in the above expres-
sion and use (26) to rewrite d0 and b01 in terms of b02 when a portfolio of contingent claims
is acquired o⁄ering full insurance against ￿ uctuations in revenue. From this substitution we
get the following expression:
q0 [M (c￿)a2 + b02 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(M (c￿)a2 + b02 ￿ a1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b02] =
= q0 [￿a1 + (1 ￿ ￿)M (c￿)a2 ￿ 1]
It is clear that the project which maximizes the above expression, and hence constitutes the
value maximizing choice of the ￿rm13, is the e¢ cient one, a￿.
Note also that the optimal level of b02 is indeterminate because the usual Modigliani-
Miller argument implies that the ￿rm￿ s capital structure is indeterminate. Any portfolio
13If the ￿rm chooses not to fully insure, and hence default occurs, it is immediate to verify that its value
is never higher.
25(b01;b02) and debt level d0 that ￿nance the project a￿ and ensure no default, that is, satisfying
(26), are a solution of the entrepreneur￿ s problem. Without loss of generality, we can impose
the additional condition that the portfolio (b01;b02) must be self-￿nancing, that is,
q01b01 + q01b02 = 0:
Using (27) this equation can be rewritten as
￿b01 + (1 ￿ ￿)b02 = 0;
that is, the market for contingent claims clears (with zero trades by consumers). We con-
clude that the project a￿ and the bond price q￿
1 = M (c￿) together constitute a competitive
equilibrium.
A similar argument su¢ ces to show that default cannot occur in equilibrium. For ex-
ample, consider the ine¢ cient equilibrium found in the previous sections in which early
producers default. In the presence of markets for contingent claims, entrepreneurs could
achieve a higher value of the debt issued at date 0 by choosing a portfolio (b01;b02) that
avoids the possibility of default and adjusting the face value of the debt d0 accordingly.
Asset purchases with IOU￿ s
The introduction of contingent claims allows entrepreneurs to fully insure against the vari-
ability in their ￿rms￿future cash￿ ow and hence removes the need for default in equilibrium.
An alternative way to attain e¢ ciency is to remove the ￿cash in advance constraint￿that re-
stricts asset purchases in period 1 and generates distortions in the asset price in that period.
In this case, default still occurs at date 1, but does not distort the entrepreneur￿ s decisions
at date 0.
Suppose, for example, that consumers are allowed to purchase assets using IOU￿ s backed
by their claims on defaulting ￿rms. In that case the total amount of ￿cash￿available to
consumers in the bond market in sub-period B is equal to the revenue received from early
producers, ￿a1, plus the value of the liquidated assets received from defaulting ￿rms in
sub-period C, q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2. The market-clearing condition now becomes
q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2 ￿ ￿a1 + q1 (1 ￿ ￿)a2;
with q1 = M (c) if the inequality is strict. Of course, the inequality must be strict since ￿a1 >
0, so the equilibrium asset price will be at the e¢ cient level q1 = M (c) and entrepreneurs
will make e¢ cient decisions. Since the value of the liquidated assets is returned to creditors
in sub-period C, the amount of ￿cash￿available to buy assets will always be greater than
the purchase price, which implies that the cash in advance constraint is never binding.
Government intervention
Another way of preventing market failure is to use Pigovian taxes to o⁄set the distortion
caused by the liquidity-constrained level of the asset price. The distortion, as we saw,
26consists in the adoption of projects with an ine¢ ciently high payo⁄ at date 1. Suppose the
government adopts a tax policy that imposes a tax on returns from early producers and a
subsidy on returns from late producers. Let ￿1 denote the tax on the income accruing to
bondholders from early producers and ￿￿2 the tax on the income they receive from late
producers. We will show that ￿ = (￿1;￿2) can be chosen so that the e¢ cient project a￿ is
chosen in equilibrium.
All tax payments are collected (or paid out, in the case of negative taxes) in the initial
sub-period A at the beginning of date 1. The policy is designed to raise zero revenue,
￿￿1a
￿
1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2q1a
￿
2; (28)
where q1 is the market-clearing price. Because the tax imposed on the revenue consumers
obtain from early producers is equal to the subsidy on the revenue consumers get from late
producers, and both the tax and the subsidy14 are paid and received at the beginning of
date 1, the total liquidity in the market remains equal to ￿a￿
1. In equilibrium we still have







Substituting from this condition into the budget balance equation (28), we see that
￿￿1a
￿








which implies that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, say.










￿a1 (1 ￿ ￿)
q1
:
This expression takes into account the taxes bondholders must pay (or receive) on their
revenue as well as the fact that the subsidy (negative tax) on the returns from the late
producers is paid at the beginning of date 1, before the asset market opens, and hence can
be invested in bonds and consumed at date 2. This is optimal because q1 < q￿
1. With this























14Unlike the payments from entrepreneurs. Also, the fact that these are taxes on bondholders￿income,
not corporate taxes, imply that the conditions under which late producers default are unchanged.
27which is satis￿ed if




The tax scheme described above is e⁄ective in deterring entrepreneurs from exploiting
the arbitrage opportunity provided by the fact that defaulting ￿rms sell at a low value.
As a consequence, liquidity remains scarce but entrepreneurs￿investment decisions are not
distorted.
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29Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we extend the de￿nition of a competitive equilibrium given in De￿nition 1 to the case
of a mixed equilibrium. In that case, a fraction ￿D of entrepreneurs choose a project aD such
that late producers default, while the remaining fraction ￿S = 1￿￿D choose a project aS such









the market clearing condition (16) becomes:















2 : xS ￿ xD
￿
and
X" ￿ fx 2 X : " ￿ xS; xD ￿ 1 ￿ "g;











M" ￿ f￿ 2 M : ￿i ￿ "; 8ig:
For any small " > 0, a correspondence
￿1 ￿ ￿2 : M" ￿ X" ￿ M" ￿ X"
is constructed in Steps 1-4 below. Let (￿;x) denote a generic element of M"￿X" and (￿0;x0)
a generic element of ￿1 (￿;x) ￿ ￿2 (￿;x).
Step 1. First, the allocation c induced by (￿;x) is given by:
c(￿;x) =
X
i=S;D ￿i ￿ (￿xi;(1 ￿ ￿)’(xi)):
Step 2. Secondly, de￿ne the map yielding the equilibrium price q1 induced by the allocation
(￿;x):











Note that, since x 2 X", both xS > 0 and xD < 1 and, hence, ’(xD) > 0. Furthermore,
since ￿ 2 M", both ￿S > 0 and ￿D > 0. Then 0 < q1 < 1 and the map de￿ned by the
30expression on the right hand side of (A2) is continuous at all (￿;x).
Step 3. Next, the following map gives the entrepreneurs￿choice which is optimal (pro￿t
















S is uniquely de￿ned because of the strict concavity of ’ and x0
S is continuous in
(￿;x) by the Maximum Theorem. The following map yields then the value of the objective









S (￿;x) + u
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D is unique, because ’ is strictly concave, and x0
D is continuous in (￿;x), because





1 (c1 (￿;x))(1 ￿ ￿)q1 (￿;x)’(x
0







denote the associated value of the objective function in (A4).
Step 4. Finally, de￿ne the maps:









0 2 arg max
~ ￿2M"
hX
i=S;D ~ ￿iVi (￿;x)
i￿
:
As established above, both x0
S and x0
D are continuous and hence so is ￿2. The functions
fVigi=D;S, being the maximum values of the maximization problems (A4), (A3), are contin-
uous by the Maximum Theorem. Also, the image set ￿1 (￿;x) is compact and convex by
construction and upper hemi-continuous by the Maximum Theorem and the continuity of
fVigi=D;S. Thus ￿1 ￿ ￿2 satis￿es the conditions of Kakutani￿ s theorem, so there exists a
￿xed point (￿;x) for every value of " > 0.
15For ￿ = 1, VS (￿;x) also equals the market value of the debt issued to ￿nance aS.
31To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we use then a limiting argument as " ! 0.
Consider a sequence of positive numbers f"ng such that limn!1 "n = 0 and let f(￿n;xn)g
denote the corresponding sequence of ￿xed points. Since the sequence is bounded there
exists a convergent subsequence. By an abuse of notation we use the same notation for
the subsequence and write limn!1 (￿n;xn) = (￿0;x0). We show next that (￿0;x0) is an
equilibrium.
Suppose that q1 (￿n;xn), the price corresponding to the ￿xed point (￿n;xn), converges to











D = 0; (A5)
or limn!1 u0
2 (c2 (￿n;xn))=u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) = 0; which in turn may only hold if c1 (￿n;xn) ! 0,
which is equivalent to, again, (A5) holding. Condition (A5) in turn implies, since xS ￿ xD,
that xn
S ! 0 and that limn!1 xn
D > 0, limn!1 ￿n



















































we get limn!1 VS (￿n;xn) < 1 while VD (￿n;xn) ! 1; which contradicts the previous
implication that ￿n
D ! 0. Thus we conclude that limn!1 q1 (￿n;xn) is bounded away from
zero.
Then it is straightforward to verify that (￿0;x0) satis￿es the equilibrium conditions:
(i) the values fx0
igi=S;D are the entrepreneurs￿optimal choices subject to the constraint that
late producers are solvent, respectively default, that is solve (A3) and (A4), for " = 0, at
q0
1 = limn!1 q1 (￿n;xn);
(ii) the distribution ￿0 is concentrated on the pro￿t-maximizing values among fx0
igi=S;D;
(iii) the asset market clears at t = 1 because (A2) is satis￿ed in the limit.￿
Proof of Lemma 2
Given the properties of a￿








as ￿ ? ￿
￿￿:
16Since xn
D must be a solution of problem (A4), this is obviously true if limn!1 u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) < 1.
But also when limn!1 u0
1 (c1 (￿n;xn)) = 1; since q1 ￿ M(c), from the ￿rst order conditions of problem
(A4) we get limn!1 ’0 (xn
S) = ￿1 and hence limn!1 xn
D > 0.







as ￿ ? ￿
￿:
By the de￿nition of ￿
￿ and ￿
￿￿ we then readily see that ￿
￿ < ￿
￿￿ if and only if ￿ < 1=2.
The rest of the claim follows by an immediate application of Proposition 3.￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Using (20), the speci￿cation given in (A4) of the program yielding the optimal production




















1 (q1;￿) denote the solution of problem (A6) and vD (q1;￿) the corresponding value of
the objective function, while the corresponding expressions for problem (A7) are aS
1 (q1;￿)
and vS (q1;￿).
When q1 = ￿, as already argued in the proof of Proposition 3, the expressions in (A6)
and (A7) are identical and equal to ￿a1+￿(1￿￿)’(a1), whose maximum is attained at the
e¢ cient project a￿ (￿). For any ￿ < ￿




1 (￿;￿) = a￿
1(￿) and vD (￿;￿) > vS (￿;￿): Moreover, since ￿a1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)’(a1) is
strictly concave in a1 and, when we maximize this expression, the constraint a1 ￿ ￿’(a1)
is binding, the optimal project aS (￿;￿) such that late producers are solvent is attained at
the value of a1 that is the closest as possible to a￿
1, i.e. is the largest possible: ^ a1 such that
^ a1 = ￿’(^ a1). More generally, let ^ a1(q1) denote the solution of a1 = q1’(a1). The following
lemma extends the argument to prices q1 < ￿ :
Lemma 3 When ￿ < ￿
￿￿, for any q1 < ￿ we have aS
1 (q1;￿) = ^ a1(q1) and
aD
1 (q1;￿) 2 argmax(1 ￿ ￿)q1’(a1) + ￿￿
a1
q1; and aD
1 (q1;￿) is decreasing in q1:
Proof. It is immediate to see that if the maximal admissible value of a1, ^ a1(q1), solves
problem (A7) when q1 = ￿, by the same argument the same is true for q1 < ￿. Consider
next the ￿rst order conditions for an interior maximum of problem (A6):
(1 ￿ ￿)q1’




As argued above a￿




1 (q1;￿) denote the solution of (A8) for arbitrary q1. Note that aDi
1 (q1;￿)







3 (1 ￿ ￿)’00 < 0:
33Hence, for all q1 < ￿; aDi
1 (q1;￿) is greater than a￿
1(￿), thus still admissible and constitutes
so a solution of (A6).
Using the properties of aS
1 (q1;￿) and aD
1 (q1;￿) established in the previous Lemma, we
can determine the pattern of vS (q1;￿) and vD (q1;￿) :
Lemma 4 Assume ’ is symmetric. Then for all ￿ < ￿
￿￿, either we have (i) vD (q1;￿) >>
vS (q1;￿) for all q1 < ￿; or (ii) we can ￿nd q0
1 < q00
1 < ￿ such that vD (q1;￿) > vS (q1;￿) for
all q1 < q0
1 and all q1 > q00
1, while vD (q1;￿) < vS (q1;￿) for all q1 2 (q0
1;q00
1).
Proof. It immediately follows from Lemma 3 that vS (q1;￿) = ￿
^ a1(q1)
q1 = ￿^ a2(q1). By
the symmetry property of ’, ^ a2(q1) must also be a solution, for all q1, of the equation















[’0(1 ￿ ￿’0) + ￿’00’][’=(1 ￿ ￿’0)] + ’0’
(1 ￿ ￿’0)
2 ;
always negative since the numerator is the sum of three terms, and they are all negative.
Thus ^ a2 - and vS - are both strictly concave and increasing functions of ￿. On the other





using the envelope theorem:
@vD
@￿










which is positive - and hence vD is also increasing in ￿ - as long as ￿ is su¢ ciently large (and
increasing for all ￿ ￿ 1=￿ if (1 ￿ ￿)￿’(a￿
1(￿)) < ￿a￿





























where the second equality sign follows by (A8). positive for all ￿, hence vD is always convex.
Finally, for ￿ large vD (￿;￿) ￿ vS (￿;￿) ￿ = ￿￿￿
￿
aD
1 (￿;￿) ￿ ^ a1 (￿;￿)
￿
> 0. Recalling that we
have shown the same inequality holds for ￿ = 1=￿; the result follows from the monotonicity
and concavity/convexity properties of vS and vD established above.
On the basis of the previous ￿ndings we can now characterize the properties of competitive
equilibria in the region ￿ < ￿
￿￿: We know from Lemma 2 that an equilibrium with q1 = ￿
34only exists when ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, since for ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
￿￿) (19) holds. Also, by De￿nition 1 at a





has to hold and, in addition, a1 = aD
1 (q1;￿) which, by Lemma 3, is equivalent to equation
(??) being satis￿ed.
We prove next that equations (A9) and (A8) have a solution with respect to q1 and a1 if
and only if ￿ > ￿
￿, and in that case the solution is unique, As shown in the proof of Lemma
3, aD
1 (q1;￿) is always continuous and decreasing in q1. The solution of (A9) with respect to
a1 is also continuous but increasing in q1. For q1 ￿ 0; aD
1 (q1;￿) ￿ 1 while the solution of
(A9) for a1 yields a1 ￿ 0. On the other hand, for q1 = ￿, we have seen that aD
1 (￿;￿) = a￿
1(￿)
and it is easy to verify17 that the solution of (A9) obtains at a value a1 < a￿
1(￿) i⁄ ￿ < ￿
￿.
Hence if ￿ < ￿
￿ equations (A8) and (A9) have no solution (such that q1 ￿ ￿), which implies
there is no symmetric ine¢ cient equilibrium with q1 < ￿. In contrast, if ￿ > ￿
￿ there is a
unique pair (a1;q1), say
￿
￿ aD
1 (￿); ￿ qD
1 (￿)
￿




1 (￿); ￿ qD
1 (￿)
￿
identi￿es a candidate symmetric, ine¢ cient equilibrium,












In addition, a mixed equilibrium might also exist at some price q1 ￿ ￿. At such an
equilibrium, a positive fraction of entrepreneurs choose project ^ a1 where late producers are
solvent and another positive fraction chooses aD
1 = aD
1 (q1;￿) where late producers default.
In addition, the entrepreneurs￿optimality condition, vD (q1;￿) = vS (q1;￿), and the following




1 ).18 Such inequality is satis￿ed if, and
only if19, ￿ qD
1 (￿) < ￿, for all q1 2 (￿ qD
1 (￿);￿). Since, as shown above, ￿ qD
1 (￿) < ￿ exists if and
only if ￿ > ￿
￿, a mixed equilibrium in the region ￿ < minf￿
￿;￿
￿￿g does not exist either,
thus establishing claim (ii).
Recalling the pattern of vD;vS established in Lemma 4, we can now characterize the set
of equilibria when ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
￿￿, thus completing the proof of Proposition 4:
1. If vD (q1;￿) ￿ vS (q1;￿) for all q1 < ￿, or if ￿ qD
1 (￿) > q00
1 (which is, recall, the highest















1 < ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q00
1 there is a unique mixed equilibriumat q00












1 (￿) is not an equilibrium.
17This follows from the fact, established in Lemma 2, that ￿ < ￿a￿
1(￿)=[(1 ￿ ￿)’(a￿
1(￿))] i⁄ ￿ < ￿
￿.
18If, and only if, this inequality is satis￿ed we can always ￿nd ￿S > 0 and ￿D = 1￿￿S > 0 such that the
bond market clearing condition (A1) holds.
19The claims follows from the facts that, at q1 = ￿ qD





1 ) holds and that aD
1 is
decreasing in q1.
353. If ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q0
1 (and hence ￿ qD
1 (￿) < q00
1), we have a symmetric equilibrium at ￿ qD
1 (￿) as
well as two mixed equilibria, one at q0
1 and one at q00
1.
Note, ￿nally, that if case 1 above holds for some ￿
0 2 (￿
￿;￿
￿￿), the same is true, a fortiori,
for all higher20 values of ￿ 2 (￿
0;￿
￿￿). Conversely, if case 3 holds, the same is true for all
lower values of ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
0).￿
20This follows from the fact that both ￿ qD
1 (￿) and ￿ aD
1 (￿) are increasing in ￿ (since (A9) does not depend
on ￿ while it is immediate to verify from (A8) that aD






The efficient allocation (a1
*,a2
*) occurs where the indifference curve defined by αu1(αa1) + 











αu1(αa1) +  









The resolution of default at date 1 occurs in three stages. In sub-period A the producers repay 
their debt, roll it over, or default. In sub-period B defaulting producers sell their claims to future 




if d0 > q0a1 and roll 
over debt otherwise. 
Late producers in 
default liquidate the 
firm by selling claims 
to future output. 
Consumers use cash in 
hand to buy  assets of 
defaulting firms. 
Late producers in default 
pay out the liquidated 
value of the firm to 
creditors. 
Consumers use the proceeds 
from liquidation of firms and 
other unspent revenue to buy 
consumption goods. 
Sub-period A  Sub-period B  Sub-period C 
Early producers pay
out min{a1,d0}. 